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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CURTIS MATTHEW O’DANIEL,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48070-2020
Ada County Case No.
CR01-19-28511

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Curtis Matthew O’Daniel failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion when it imposed a sentence of eight years with three years fixed, suspended in favor of
probation, on a conviction for felony domestic battery?
ARGUMENT
O’Daniel Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
O’Daniel was involved in an argument with his wife and began repeatedly punching her
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with a closed fist. (PSI, pp. 268-69. 1) As O’Daniel punched her “more times than she could
count,” she managed to retrieve pepper spray from her pocket and use it to stop the attack. (Id.)
She was treated for extensive bruising, nausea, a black eye, and other injuries. (PSI, pp. 36-63,
131, 269.) The state charged O’Daniel with felony domestic violence causing a traumatic injury.
(R., p. 26.) O’Daniel was convicted following a jury trial. (R., pp. 82-98, 131-32.) At sentencing,
the state recommended ten years with three years fixed, suspended in favor of probation, but with
some period of jail time to be determined by the court. (Tr., p. 240 (p. 15, Ls. 2-16). 2) Defense
counsel recommended three years with one year fixed, suspended in favor of probation. (Tr., p.
242 (p. 23, Ls. 2-9).) O’Daniel himself requested probation, but with respect to the underlying
sentence stated, “I don’t care. I don’t care. Just do whatever you’re going to do.” (Tr., p. 242 (p.
24, Ls. 5-20).) The district court imposed a sentence of eight years with two years fixed, suspended
in favor of probation, with no jail time. (Tr., p. 243 (p. 26, L. 11 – p. 27, L. 7); R., pp. 148-51.)
O’Daniel timely appealed. (R., pp. 163-65.)
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s
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Citations to the PSI refer to the 426-page electronic document containing the confidential
exhibits, including the report of the presentence investigator.
2
The volume of transcripts contains 255 pages of various transcripts, including of the trial. The
only transcript cited herein is the transcript of the sentencing hearing, held May 15, 2020, and
contained at pages 237-47 of the volume. Following the convention set out in O’Daniel’s opening
brief (Appellant’s brief, p. 2, n. 1), the state will cite initially to the pagination of the volume as a
whole, and then parenthetically to the separate pagination and line numbering associated with the
sentencing hearing in particular.
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probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it
is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). In evaluating whether a lower court abused
its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court:
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho
261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421
P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C.

O’Daniel Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
As O’Daniel acknowledges, his underlying sentence is within statutory limits. (Appellant’s

brief, p. 3.) As a result, to bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, he must
establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell,
144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To establish that the sentence was excessive, the
appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate
to accomplish any one of the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and
retribution. Id. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary
objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392 P.3d at 1236-37 (quoting State
v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
O’Daniel argues that the district court “did not exercise reason” because it “should have
imposed a lesser underlying sentencing in light of the mitigating factors, including his mental
3

health issues, success on pre-trial release, and family support.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 3.) O’Daniel
has not shown that the district court abused its discretion.
The district court expressly considered O’Daniel’s mental health issues and his prior
success on supervised release when formulating the sentence imposed. The court determined that
probation was appropriate in light of O’Daniel’s prior success with supervised release. (Tr., p.
243 (p. 25, Ls. 2-8).) With respect to O’Daniel’s mental health issues, the court stated that it was
only because O’Daniel suffered from mental health issues and the court believed those issues were
“likely” a contributing factor to the offense that the court granted probation rather than retaining
jurisdiction. (Tr., p. 243 (p. 25, Ls. 9-21).) The court thus took both O’Daniel’s mental health
issues and his prior success on supervised release into consideration in its decision to suspend the
sentence. With respect to O’Daniel’s family support, O’Daniel cites a single line from the PSI in
which his mother stated that she was his “main support” and she believed he wanted to stay sober
and focus on his mental health. (Appellant’s brief, p. 4 (citing PSI, pp. 274-75).) As an initial
matter, this is the same family support that he had when he battered his wife. But, in addition, his
mother goes on only to request probation (just as O’Daniel himself did (Tr., p. 242 (p. 24, Ls. 520)), suggesting that retained jurisdiction would be “traumatic and unsettling for him with his
medications and health.” (PSI, pp. 274-75.) The district court did as she requested by granting
probation.
Having taken the mitigating factors to which O’Daniel points on appeal into consideration,
the court determined that the underlying sentence was necessary in light of “how serious this was”
and the “visible wounds to the victim.” (Tr., p. 243 (p. 25, L. 9 – p. 26, L. 10).) Thus, the court
balanced the mitigating factors, which led it to grant probation, against the aggravating factors,
which led it to impose the underlying sentence it did. O’Daniel has not shown that that balancing
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was an abuse of discretion. State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 932, 104 P.3d 969, 974 (2005)
(emphasizing the discretionary nature of weighing mitigating and aggravating factors).
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 22nd day of April, 2021.

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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